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Mike Redmayne * 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The right to confront adverse witnesses has brought the English courts into conflict 
with the European Court of Human Rights. Drawing on confrontation doctrine in Europe and 
the United States, this paper argues that there is no convincing rationale for the sort of strong 
confrontation right found under the ECHR and the US constitution. A more pragmatic 
approach to confrontation, based on the best evidence principle, is advocated. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The right to confrontation has brought English courts into a showdown with the 
European Court of Human Rights. Article 6(3) of the ECHR provides that 
‘everyone charged with a criminal offence’ has the right to ‘examine or have 
examined witnesses against him’. This basically means that the accused, or his 
lawyer, should have a chance to put questions to adverse witnesses. In the 
combined cases of Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom,1 the prosecution had 
introduced witness statements from witnesses who were not present at the 
defendants’ trials. Strasbourg held that there was a breach of the confrontation 
right because the convictions were based ‘solely or to a decisive extent’ on the 
evidence of absent witnesses, even where the witness was absent for good reason: 
                                                     
* Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science. A version of this paper was 
presented at a conference on Evidence Law and Human Rights at the University of New South Wales in 
April 2010. I am grateful to the participants for their comments, and to Sydney Law School for hosting 
me when I got stranded. 
1 (2009) 49 EHRR 1. 
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in Al-Khawaja the witness (the complainant in a sexual assault trial) was dead. The 
English courts have found this hard to accept. In Horncastle the UK Supreme 
Court and Court of Appeal agreed that the ECtHR jurisprudence on 
confrontation should not be followed.2 English hearsay law is therefore currently 
in conflict with the Convention: defendants can be convicted on hearsay evidence, 
in breach of Article 6. Al-Khawaja has now had a rehearing before the ECtHR’s 
Grand Chamber, so a second judgment is awaited.3 While it is possible that the 
Court will relent, it is just as likely that it will stick to its hard line – an approach 
that many commentators think is right.4 
Confrontation rights also have a lively recent history in the United States. The 
Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution provides that ‘in all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right [...] to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him’. In a 2004 decision, Crawford v Washington,5 the Supreme 
Court reinvigorated this clause, finding, in a reversal of its previous approach, that 
even if there are indications that a witness statement is reliable, it would not 
necessarily be admissible under the Confrontation Clause.6 The evidence at issue 
in Al-Khawaja and Tahery would now not be admissible in the United States. To this 
extent the American echoes the European approach. However, confrontation law 
in the two jurisdictions also differs. Simply put, the US approach is rather stricter 
than the European one – there is no exception, for example, for evidence which is 
not the ‘sole or decisive’ basis on which the accused is convicted. In a series of 
cases since Crawford, the Supreme Court has reiterated its strict approach, while 
filling out the details of the confrontation right – though not without dissent. 
It is obvious that there is much at stake in debates about confrontation. 
Where a witness makes a statement to the police incriminating the accused and 
then dies, or cannot be found, or is no longer fit to testify, or, perhaps, is too 
scared to come to court, then her statement cannot be introduced at trial. While 
under the European approach there is the caveat that the evidence can be 
admitted if it is not ‘sole or decisive’, the practical effect in both jurisdictions is the 
same: where a prosecution depends on the evidence of an absent witness, the 
prosecution must fail, even if a court provided with the evidence would consider 
the case to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In this paper I take a close look at 
confrontation, in particular exploring its theoretical basis, in order to see whether 
this result can be justified. I may as well say at the outset that I do not believe that 
                                                     
2 R v Horncastle and Others [2009] 2 Cr App R 15 (CA); [2009] UKSC 14. 
3 The case was heard on 19 May 2010. A webcast of the hearing is available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Press/Multimedia/Webcasts+of+public+hearings/webca
stEN_media?&p_url=20100519-1/lang/.  
4 See, eg, S. Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: OUP, 2005) ch 11. See further the 
views of commentators such as Friedman and O’Brian, discussed below. But cf I. Dennis, ‘The Right to 
Confront Witnesses: Meanings, Myths and Human Rights’ (2010) Crim LR 255. 
5 541 US 36 (2004). 
6 The previous authority was Ohio v Roberts 448 US 56 (1980), under which the confrontation right would 
be satisfied if the evidence at issue bore ‘indicia of reliability’, which might be either case specific or 
presumed because the evidence was admissible under a ‘firmly rooted’ hearsay exception. 
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it can be – though that is not to say that there is no value in confrontation, nor 
that the failure to afford it to the accused should never be a bar to conviction. I 
confine the discussion to absent witnesses, although in Europe the confrontation 
right has also generated a significant case law on anonymous witnesses.7 While my 
principle focus is on the situation in Europe, I pay considerable attention to US 
case law and scholarship, for it is here that we find the richest attempts to define 
and justify a confrontation right. 
Analysis of confrontation is not straightforward, because neither the ECtHR 
nor the US Supreme Court has elaborated a detailed theory of confrontation. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has been criticised for developing a case law under 
which the most that can be said is that ‘the purpose of confrontation is 
confrontation’.8 In that respect, there is no clear target to aim at. The scholarly 
literature is somewhat more helpful, but scholars have offered a range of ways of 
theorising confrontation, and these theories tend to have different implications for 
the scope of the confrontation right. As I hope to show, to that extent, theory 
matters. The analysis will start, however, not with the theory but with a closer look 
at confrontation doctrine in the two jurisdictions. This will give us a clearer idea of 
what we are dealing with, and just what it is that any theory of confrontation needs 
to justify. 
 
 
 
CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
SCOPE 
 
The confrontation right overlaps with, but is narrower than, the hearsay rule. The 
hearsay rule has, at least prima facie, a wide scope. A simple explanation of the 
rule is that ‘a statement other than one made by a person while giving oral 
evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any fact stated’.9 While 
the rule has been tweaked slightly by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, in an attempt 
to make it clear that ‘implied assertions’ are not facts stated and therefore not 
excluded by the hearsay rule,10 the rule still applies to a wide range of statements. 
Statements made to the police are covered, but so are statements made in informal 
conversations between friends and statements made in business records, such as a 
factory record of the engine block numbers of cars.11 In the United States at least, 
it is clear that the scope of the confrontation right does not extend this far. Under 
                                                     
7 See, eg, Doorson v The Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330. For the UK reaction, and detailed discussion of 
the ECHR cases, see R v Davis [2008] UKHL 36. 
8 See R. Park, ‘Is Confrontation the Bottom Line?’ (2006-7) 19 Regent U L Rev 459, 467. Park attributes 
the phrase to Peter Tillers. 
9 R. Cross, Cross on Evidence (London: Butterworths, 5th ed, 1979) 6. 
10 ss 114, 115. Whether this successfully excludes implied assertions is a complex issue: D. Birch and M. 
Hirst, ‘Interpreting the New Concept of Hearsay’ (2010) 69 CLJ 72. 
11 The facts of Myers v DPP [1965] AC 1001. 
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Crawford, it has been held to apply only to ‘testimonial’ statements. ‘Testimonial’ is 
intended to pick out reasonably formal statements,12 but the Supreme Court has 
declined to give a precise definition of the concept. In Crawford itself it observed 
that various definitions had been offered in argument; perhaps the widest of these 
was ‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial’.13 In later cases the Court has still declined to define ‘testimonial’, but it has 
held that laboratory reports by forensic scientists are testimonial,14 as are 
statements made by a complainant to the police shortly after an alleged incident of 
domestic violence.15 Statements made in an emergency telephone call to the 
police, however, were not classified as testimonial, because the operator would 
have been concentrating on dealing with the emergency rather than producing 
evidence for later trial.16  
Under the ECHR, things are less clear, but it may well be that the right in 
Article 6(3) does not apply to more informal types of hearsay. In all of the cases 
where a violation has been found, the problematic evidence seems to have been 
statements made to investigative authorities – police officers or examining 
judges;17 indeed, the Court commonly uses the word ‘deposition’ to describe the 
type of evidence to which the confrontation right attaches.18 Thus where a witness 
gives what a common lawyer regards as hearsay evidence, there may not be an 
issue under the Convention so long as the hearsay evidence does not take the 
form of a witness statement. In AM v Italy, G, a child, had complained to his 
parents that during a holiday in Italy he had been indecently assaulted by the 
applicant.19 Statements were taken from G’s parents and from a psychotherapist 
who was treating him. The arguments before the ECtHR focussed on the absence 
of confrontation of these witnesses, with the Court finding a breach of 6(3) 
because the applicant ‘did not have a chance to examine the witness statements 
that formed the basis of his conviction.’20 This suggests that had these witnesses 
                                                     
12 See Crawford, n 5 above, 51: ‘An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears 
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.’ See also Giles 
v California 554 US __ (2008) at 22: ‘statements by friends and neighbours […] and statements to 
physicians […]’ would not be excluded under the confrontation clause. 
13 n 5 above, 52. 
14 Melendez Diaz v Massachusetts 557 US __ (2009). 
15 Davis v Washington 547 US 813 (2006). 
16 ibid, 822. 
17 See J.R. Spencer, Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) 43-44. 
18 eg AM v Italy Appln No 37019/97 (1999) at [25]; Luca v Italy (2003) 36 EHRR 46 at [40]; PS v Germany 
(2003) 36 EHRR 61 at [24]. Another common formulation is ‘statements made at the investigative stage’, 
eg Gossa v Poland Appln No 47986/99 (2007). On the other hand, the text of article 6(3) refers to 
‘witnesses’ which, in some cases, has been given a reasonably wide interpretation, to include anyone 
whose statements are relied on by the court, eg Kostovski v Netherlands (1990) 12 EHRR 434 at [40]; 
though note the reference to ‘statements, as recorded by the police’ in SN v Sweden (2004) EHRR 13 at 
[45]. 
19 ibid. 
20 ibid at [28]. 
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been confronted, proceedings would have been Convention compliant, even 
though the witnesses would have been relating hearsay, ie what G had told them.21  
Some witnesses may make statements to the police that, while helpful to the 
prosecution case, do not directly incriminate the accused: an example would be a 
statement such as ‘I heard a gunshot at 11 o’clock’. In contrast, all of the cases in 
which the ECtHR has found a violation seem to have involved accusatory 
statements, where the defendant accuses a specific person of a crime.22 In X v 
United Kingdom, various people who had filmed an incident in Northern Ireland at 
which the killing of two soldiers took place were allowed to give evidence in court 
anonymously.23 The evidence apparently involved the witnesses describing the 
making of their films and photos of the incident; they did not identify the 
applicant themselves. There were several reasons why the Commission found that 
in this case anonymity did not infringe the confrontation right, but one was that 
this evidence ‘did not implicate the applicant’.24 There is very little to go on here, 
so it is impossible to say how significant this observation is, or how accusatory a 
statement would have to be before it required confrontation: an eyewitness who 
provides a description to the police of the person who attacked her might be said 
to implicate a defendant without accusing him.25 But while one can only speculate 
as to what the scope of the ECHR’s confrontation right is, there must surely be 
some limit to the right. Otherwise the prosecution would not be able to rely on 
business records in a case where the original maker of the record was dead or 
could no longer be identified. 
There are various reasons why the restricted focus of the confrontation right 
is significant. One is that it undermines some of the arguments made in Horncastle, 
the case where the UK Supreme Court and Court of Appeal refused to follow the 
ECtHR’s decision in Al-Khawaja.26 The main argument in the judgments is that 
hearsay can sometimes be perfectly reliable, and thus to rule that it cannot be the 
‘sole or decisive’ element in a conviction is to take an unnecessarily strict 
approach. But, if it is right that Strasbourg sees confrontation as confined to 
statements made to the authorities, the English courts, by framing the argument in 
                                                     
21 cf S.J. Summers, ‘The Right to Confrontation After Crawford v. Washington: A “Continental 
European” Perspective’ (2004) 2 International Commentary on Evidence 8, who claims that the ECHR would 
apply in this situation, though she cites no evidence in support. See also S. Maffei, The European Right to 
Confrontation in Criminal Proceedings: Absent, Anonymous and Vulnerable Witnesses (Groningen: Europa, 2006) 
74 ((‘occasionally, statements to private third parties (such as doctors, friends, or relatives) have also been 
dealt with under Article 6, when they have been relied upon as hearsay’: again, no authorities are cited in 
support)).  
22 See W.E. O’Brian, ‘The Right of Confrontation: US and European Perspectives’ (2005) 121 LQR 481, 
494. 
23 (1993) 15 EHRR (CD) 113. 
24 ibid at [1].  
25 This way of thinking about confrontation was explicitly rejected by a majority of the US Supreme 
Court in Melendez Diaz, n 14 above, 7-9. 
26 n 2 above.  
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terms of hearsay, are to some extent missing the point.27 This is most obvious 
when we consider a series of examples given by the Court of Appeal, and 
endorsed by the Supreme Court, which are intended to demonstrate that 
Strasbourg is being too strict.28 In one example a woman makes an emergency 
telephone call to the police and identifies the person who is attacking her. But this 
is not really a statement made in response to police questioning, and so might not 
be seen as a ‘statement’ or ‘deposition’ in the ECtHR’s terms. Nor, in all 
likelihood, would it be regarded as testimonial in the US.29 Another example 
involves bank records in a fraud case; here it is even clearer that the records would 
not be regarded as prompting confrontation in either jurisdiction.30 The example 
that comes closest to raising a confrontation issue31 involves a witness who writes 
down the registration number of a car involved in a drive-by shooting; there is 
sufficient corroborating evidence to rule out the possibility of mistake. If the 
witness reports the number to the police, then there is a good chance that the 
confrontation right under the ECHR and the Sixth Amendment would apply. But 
Strasbourg’s answer cannot quite be predicted with confidence, for in the terms 
introduced above the report of the number plate implicates but does not accuse. A 
better example would be one where the witness claims to recognise the car’s 
driver, and gives the police a specific person’s name. This is plainly accusatorial 
and does not, I think, quite deliver the intuition that the Court of Appeal wanted: 
that there would be no value in confrontation.  
 
WHAT DOES CONFRONTATION INVOLVE? 
 
Paradigmatically, confrontation involves the relevant witness testifying in the 
accused’s physical presence at trial, with the accused being able to put questions.32 
But departures from this paradigm may be permissible. In its pre-Crawford case 
law, the United States Supreme Court ruled that procedures allowing child 
                                                     
27 The conflation of hearsay and confrontation is especially puzzling because the distinction was 
discussed by the Court of Appeal in Owen [2001] EWCA Crim 1018. The point is also clearly made by 
Spencer, n 17 above, 43-44. 
28 n 2 above at [61]-[63]. 
29 See Davis, n 15 above. Confrontation would not be required so long as the emergency operator could 
objectively be considered as concentrating on responding to the emergency.  
30 But note Papageorgiou v Greece Appln No 59506/00 (2003), where the rest of the right specified in Art 
6(3)(d) (‘[...] to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf [...]’) was used to 
criticise a failure to provide the originals of various documents.  
31 I ignore an example in which a defendant signals willingness to plead guilty to a charge of drug 
possession, as the example is too under-described to make sense of. 
32 Some would contend that true confrontation should involve the defendant having a right to cross-
examine the witness in person: for example, Friedman has argued that provisions in the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, denying this right in certain circumstances, are objectionable. See R.D. 
Friedman, ‘Thoughts From Across the Water on Hearsay and Confrontation’ (1998) Crim LR 697, 708-
709. It is clear that under the ECHR there is no right to cross-examine in person, eg SN v Sweden (2004) 
EHRR 13. 
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witnesses to testify by video link could be constitutional.33 It is not clear whether 
the Court would come to the same decision post-Crawford.34 Under Crawford, 
however, it is clear that if the witness will be unavailable at trial, the confrontation 
right can be satisfied by giving the defendant the opportunity to put questions to 
the witness prior to the trial – in other words, without the fact-finder being 
present.35 It is hard to imagine that anonymous witness testimony would be 
permissible in the United States. 
The European Court of Human Rights’ approach to confrontation puts less 
emphasis on the witness testifying in the physical presence of the accused. The 
core of the right under the ECHR seems to be that the accused should have some 
ability to put questions to the witness: procedures whereby the witness is 
questioned pre-trial, outside the presence of the accused or his lawyer, but where 
the defence has the ability to influence the questions put to the witness, may 
comply with Article 6(3).36 Witness anonymity is permitted, so long as ‘counter-
balancing’ measures are in place.37 Testimony via video link would not raise an 
issue under the Convention.38 
 
EXCEPTIONS 
 
For the purposes of this paper, the most significant exception to the confrontation 
right is forfeiture, considered separately below. Other than forfeiture, the 
confrontation right in the United States may be exceptionless – though in Crawford 
the Supreme Court noted that dying declarations might be seen as an exception, 
because they were so considered at the time the Constitution was written.39 Dying 
declarations, however, are a narrow category.40 The evidence at issue in Al-Khawaja 
was not a dying declaration, because the witness was not dying when it was made. 
The fact that she later died, and so could not testify at trial, would not give rise to 
an exception in the United States. As we have seen, the position under the ECHR 
is similar: where confrontation is concerned, impossibility is no excuse. However, 
                                                     
33 Maryland v Craig 497 US 836 (1990), a 5-4 majority decision. In an earlier case, Coy v Iowa 487 US 1012 
(1988), special measures (the use of a screen to obstruct the complainant’s view of D) were held to 
breach the Confrontation Clause, because there was no showing of necessity. Thus interferences with the 
‘face to face’ aspect of confrontation need to be carefully justified. 
34 The Court has denied certiorari in one case that would have raised the issue. See ‘A Challenge to 
Maryland v Craig’, at http://confrontationright.blogspot.com, entry for March 21 2007. The case was 
Vogelsberg v Wisconsin, petition 06-1253, and certiorari is recorded as denied in the Supreme Court’s Order 
List for May 14 2007. 
35 Crawford, n 5 above, 68. 
36 SN v Sweden (2004) EHRR 13. It is important that D is legally advised at any pre-trial confrontation: 
Melnikov v Russia Appln No 23610/03 (2010). 
37 Doorson v Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330. 
38 In Accardi v Italy Appln No 30598/02 (admissibility decision, 2005), a procedure whereby the 
complainants were questioned prior to trial, outside D’s presence (but where D had an opportunity to put 
questions), and a video tape of the questioning was presented at trial, was found not to infringe Art 6. 
39 Crawford, n 5 above, 56 n 6. 
40 Not just any statement by a dying person is admissible. Under the US Federal Rules of Evidence (rule 
804(a)), the statement is only admissible in a prosecution for murder, if it relates to the cause of death, 
and was made in the belief that death was imminent.  
                         10/2010 
 
 8
Strasbourg does take a more flexible approach than the US Supreme Court, in that 
a statement made by an absent witness will be admissible if it is not the ‘sole or 
decisive’ basis of conviction. This is a vague criterion – almost any evidence relied 
on by the prosecution might turn out to be decisive, in that it might be the feather 
that tips the scales – and it has not always been consistently applied by the 
ECtHR.41 In recent cases, however, the notion seems to be applied quite strictly. 
In Al-Khawaja the witness statement was reasonably well corroborated: another 
complainant had made a similar allegation against the defendant, and the absent 
witness had initially made her allegations to friends. But the statement was still 
considered to be decisive. There is some ambiguity in the judgment, however, as 
to whether use of a decisive statement from an absent witness will inevitably make 
the trial unfair. The Government argued that, because Al-Khawaja had had 
alternative means of challenging the witness statement, there were measures in 
place to ‘counter-balance’ the lack of confrontation. The ECtHR disagreed on the 
facts, but did not quite rule out the possibility of counter-balancing.42 
 
FORFEITURE 
 
In the United States under Crawford, the only significant exception to the 
confrontation right is forfeiture. The defendant can lose the confrontation right 
through his own wrongful behaviour. This exception was noted in Crawford, and 
considered in detail in Giles v California.43 In Giles, D had killed his former 
girlfriend. He claimed self-defence, and the prosecution introduced evidence of 
the girlfriend’s statements made to a police officer responding to an earlier 
incident of domestic violence. While recognising a forfeiture exception, a majority 
of the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the victim had died at Giles’s 
hands was not enough to engage forfeiture. The exception was construed 
narrowly, as applying only to conduct designed to prevent the victim from 
testifying. While, in a rather strained argument, the majority did suggest that a 
court might find that Giles had forfeited his right on the grounds that one of the 
purposes of domestic violence is to control and isolate the victim,44 the general 
implication of the decision is that a defendant like Giles can object to testimony 
on the grounds of a lack of confrontation that is his own fault. The minority was 
troubled by this, and would have defined the forfeiture exception more widely. 
It is not clear what approach the ECtHR would take where the absence of a 
witness has been caused by a defendant. In Rachdad, the Court noted that the 
                                                     
41 cf Unterprertinger v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 175 and Asch v Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 597. Occasionally 
the test is restricted to ‘sole’, eg Gossa, n 18 above at [55] (cf [63]); Rachdad v France Appln No 71846/01 
(2003) at [24]. 
42 See n 1 above at [37]: the court ‘doubts’, but does not rule out, the possibility of counter-balancing. 
Later, it discusses the government’s counter-balancing arguments on their merits: see [41]-[48]. 
43 n 12 above.  
44 ibid, 23. 
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applicant had contributed to the difficulty in securing confrontation: he had 
apparently been abroad (allegedly to avoid arrest) when he had initially been 
convicted in his absence, and by the time he appealed his convictions, some five 
years later, only one witness attended court.45 However, a breach of article 6 was 
still found. In Al-Khawaja and Tahery, the Court referred to the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment in Sellick, noting that that case:  
 
was concerned with identified witnesses and the trial judge allowed their 
statements to be read to the jury because he was satisfied that they were being 
kept from giving evidence through fear induced by the defendants. That is 
not the case in either of the present applications and, in the absence of such 
special circumstances, the Court doubts whether any counterbalancing factors 
would be sufficient to justify the introduction in evidence of an untested 
statement which was the sole or decisive basis for the conviction of an 
applicant.46 
 
This implies that forfeiture would be recognised in a strong case. It may be, 
however, that like the US Supreme Court, Strasbourg would take a restrictive view 
of the doctrine.47 
 
 
 
THEORISING CONFRONTATION 
 
I observed above that neither the ECtHR nor the US Supreme Court has gone 
very far in developing an explicit theory of confrontation. Nevertheless, there is 
value in exploring what these courts have said about the confrontation right, 
before turning to the rather better developed accounts in the literature. At the 
outset, it is worth noting that there are two main ways in which confrontation – 
and indeed most procedural rights – can be theorised. Confrontation might be 
seen as a right that is instrumental to fact-finding, because it in some way 
promotes accurate verdicts. We can refer to such accounts of confrontation as 
‘epistemic’. Alternatively, confrontation might be thought of as what we might 
term a non-epistemic right. On this view, there would be value in a confrontation 
right in a particular case even if it would not promote accuracy, perhaps because 
insisting on confrontation is a way of respecting the defendant’s dignity. In making 
                                                     
45 n 41 above. See also Artner v Austria Appln No 13161/87 (1992) for a similar situation; here the 
ECtHR found no breach of Art 6, but it does not appear to have put any weight on an argument for 
forfeiture, instead relying on the fact that the witness statement was corroborated. 
46 n 1 above, 37. 
47 In Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v Spain Appln No 10590/83 (1988) at [82], the Court rejected the 
argument that a failure to object to a decision not to read out certain statements at trial could be taken as 
waiver of the confrontation right, commenting that ‘According to the Court’s established case-law, waiver 
of the exercise of a right guaranteed by the Convention – in so far as it is permissible – must be 
established in an unequivocal manner.’ See also Craxi v Italy Appln No 34896/97 (2003) at [91]. 
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this distinction, I do not want to suggest that these are mutually exclusive ways of 
thinking about confrontation. No doubt many who value confrontation do so for 
a mixture of epistemic and non-epistemic reasons. Nevertheless, the distinction is 
a useful way of analysing arguments about confrontation.  
 
STRASBOURG 
 
To date, most of the indications are that the ECtHR understands the value of 
confrontation in purely epistemic terms. The only two explicit statements about 
the importance of confrontation seem to be that, where it is lacking, a defendant is 
deprived of ‘any opportunity of observing the demeanour of [the] witness when 
under direct questioning, and thus of testing her reliability’,48 and that, in the case 
of an anonymous witness: 
 
the nature and scope of the questions [the defence] could put were 
considerably restricted. [...] If the defence is unaware of the identity of the 
person it seeks to question, it may be deprived of the very particulars enabling 
it to demonstrate that he or she is prejudiced, hostile or unreliable. Testimony 
or other declarations inculpating an accused may well be designedly 
untruthful or simply erroneous and the defence will scarcely be able to bring 
this to light if it lacks the information permitting it to test the author’s 
reliability or cast doubt on his credibility. The dangers inherent in such a 
situation are obvious. Furthermore, each of the trial courts was precluded by 
the absence of the said anonymous persons from observing their demeanour 
under questioning and thus forming its own impression of their reliability.49  
 
As we have seen, however, while face to face confrontation at trial is the preferred 
method of eliciting testimony,50 departures from this ideal can be counter-
balanced by the defendant’s having the ability to put questions to a witness 
through a judge or lawyer in a pre-trial process.51 The emphasis on reliability is 
reflected in the comment in Gossa that the evidence of an absent witness should be 
treated with ‘extreme care’.52 Similarly, in Trivedi v United Kingdom  the Commission 
observed that counsel had been able to comment on the statements of an absent 
witness ‘with a view to casting doubt on his credibility and reliability’ and that the 
jury had been warned to put less weight on the evidence than that of witnesses 
who had been heard at trial.53 In cases where confrontation has been lacking, the 
                                                     
48 PS v Germany, n 18 above at [26]. 
49 Kostovski, n 18 above at [42]-[43]. 
50 See, eg, Luca, n 18 above at [39]. 
51 See, eg, SN, n 18 above. 
52 n 18 above at [55]. See also Doorson, n 7 above, 76; Melnikov, n 36 above, 75 (statements of co-accused 
require particular care). 
53 [1997] EHRLR 521. 
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emphasis on whether the statement is the sole or decisive evidence also indicates 
that the unreliability of unconfronted evidence is the key concern. 
The only element of the Strasbourg case law that might be hard to square 
with an emphasis on reliability is the apparent restriction of the confrontation 
right to some sort of testimonial evidence – statements made to the authorities, or 
perhaps a narrower group of ‘accusatorial’ statements. To the common lawyer 
familiar with the concept of hearsay, this focus might seem odd. The ‘hearsay 
dangers’ of veracity, perceptual ability, memory and ambiguity can affect any 
hearsay evidence and can be best explored through cross-examination of the 
declarant. Under a non-epistemic conception of the confrontation right, however, 
it might be thought that the defendant’s ability to challenge his accusers – those 
who denounce him to the authorities – is a way of respecting his dignity. The 
restriction to statements to the authorities, however, does not necessarily indicate 
that the ECtHR conceptualises confrontation as a non-epistemic right. A rule that 
all testimony should be subject to direct challenge by the defendant risks being so 
broad as to be unworkable, as it would extend to things such as business records. 
A focus on accusatorial statements to the authorities might then be a way of 
marking out a particular category of statement that will be potentially outcome-
determinative and where the risks of the witness having an axe to grind (as in the 
earlier example where the witness to the drive by shooting gives a name to the 
police) are especially great. Like any rule, this will be imperfect, sometimes being 
over- and sometimes under-inclusive with regards to its rationale (guaranteeing a 
reasonable degree of reliability), but it might still draw the line in a sensible place.54 
A problem with this ‘rule-utilitarian’ defence of the confrontation right, however, 
is that it fits poorly with the ECtHR’s general approach to Article 6. The Court 
has repeatedly said that it does not lay down specific admissibility rules but makes 
an overall assessment of whether a trial has been fair; member states therefore 
have considerable discretion about the way in which a fair trial is delivered.55 If, as 
the English courts claimed in Horncastle, evidence subject to the confrontation 
right can nevertheless be reliable enough to be properly decisive, then the ECtHR 
should not use rule-based reasoning to justify an exceptionless right.56 
 
CRAWFORD 
 
When it comes to the US Supreme Court, the first point to make is that, in its 
recent case law, the Court has taken a relatively originalist approach to 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. Its concern has largely been with how 
                                                     
54 It is important to emphasise that just because a statement does not fall within the domain of an 
absolute inadmissibility rule does not mean that it will be admitted. There might be other reasons for 
exclusion; in England the issue would fall to be decided under the general rules for the exclusion of 
hearsay. 
55 As Maffei, n 21 above, 71, puts it: ‘ECHR rulings on criminal evidence may be seen as a list of 
“obligations of result”, with national courts being allowed to follow their own rules so long as the end 
result ensures fairness to the defendant.’ 
56 See further Dennis, n 4 above.  
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the clause would have been understood at the time of the founding. Thus in Giles 
the majority’s analysis of forfeiture was based almost entirely on the eighteenth 
century case law.57 In this way, the Court has felt little need to justify the 
confrontation requirement: as noted earlier, it has tended to the view that the 
‘purpose of confrontation is confrontation’.58 Where it has gone further, and 
discussed the rationale for the right, it has tended to deny that the scope of the 
right should be moulded by reliability criteria. This is not surprising, because 
Crawford and its progeny have been trying to distance the Court from the previous 
Roberts approach,59 where a reliability assessment governed admissibility. The most 
striking rejection of a reliability analysis comes in a footnote in Melendez-Diaz: 
 
The analysts who swore the affidavits provided testimony against Melendez-
Diaz, and they are therefore subject to confrontation; we would reach the 
same conclusion if all analysts always possessed the scientific acumen of Mme 
Curie and the veracity of Mother Theresa.60 
 
And in Crawford itself: ‘Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is 
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is 
obviously guilty.’61 
However, that reliability is rejected as a touchstone for delimiting the 
confrontation right does not mean that the right is not justified on reliability 
grounds. In fact Crawford is explicit that it is:  
 
To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it 
is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by 
testing in the crucible of cross-examination.62 
 
Part of the Court’s worry here, one reflected in the jury analogy, is probably that 
judges should not be trusted to make reliability determinations. Thus Roberts is 
criticised for allowing the jury to hear unconfronted evidence ‘based on a mere 
judicial determination of reliability’,63 and the Constitution is held to operate as a 
constraint on judicial discretion.64 In this way the connection between 
confrontation and reliability reflects the rule-utilitarian interpretation of the 
ECtHR’s approach explored above. We cannot trust case-by-case judgments of 
                                                     
57 n 12 above. 
58 See n 8 above. 
59 See n 6 above. 
60 n 14 above, 14. 
61 n 5 above, 62. 
62 ibid, 61. 
63 ibid, 62. The distrust of judges also surfaces in Giles, as a reason for having a narrow forfeiture doctrine. 
See n 12 above, 11. 
64 ibid, 67-68. 
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reliability, so we establish a strict rule even at the price of excluding some reliable 
evidence.  But the Court’s approach is not quite this straightforward. Because it 
has been much more explicit than has the ECtHR in restricting confrontation to 
testimonial statements, it has had to go some way towards defining ‘testimonial’. 
As the comments about Marie Curie in Melendez-Diaz show, it has not used 
reliability as a touchstone here, even though that might have been one way of 
getting a crisp rule (‘laboratory reports are not subject to confrontation’). Rather 
than using reliability to define ‘testimonial’, the majority on the Supreme Court 
have preferred to quote from 1828 dictionaries.65 One interpretation of what is 
going on is that there is a mixture of originalism and rule-utilitarianism, where the 
Court accepts the rule utilitarian balance of the founders. But things are still more 
complex than this, because in deciding whether confrontation attaches to forms of 
evidence – 911 calls and forensic scientists’ reports – not envisaged in 1791, the 
Court has had to be somewhat creative. As the majority put it in Melendez-Diaz, 
‘[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was 
originally directed is a recipe for its extinction.’66 To the extent they have been 
creative, the majority have been criticised for an analysis ‘disconnected from the 
prosecutorial abuses targeted by the Confrontation Clause.’67 
Another way of interpreting what the Supreme Court has been doing in 
Crawford and later cases points to a more explicitly non-epistemic basis for its 
holdings. In the analogy with the right to jury trial, quoted above, there may be an 
element of ‘that’s just the way we do things’. We try cases by jury, and we demand 
that testimony be given in a manner that allows confrontation. This is the way that 
one important commentator, Richard Friedman, has tended to frame the 
confrontation right, and Friedman has obviously influenced the Supreme Court.68 
If we see the confrontation right as historically embedded – as, like jury trial and 
the adversarial system, part of our culture – then it does not necessarily make 
sense to ask why we do things that way.69  
No doubt more could be said about the approach to confrontation taken by 
the US Supreme Court in its recent decisions; these cases are rich material for 
exegesis. But given that our focus is ultimately on the situation in Europe, enough 
                                                     
65 ibid, 4. 
66 n 14 above, 16, n 5. 
67 Davis, n 15 above, 839-840. 
68 See, eg, R.D. Friedman, ‘“Face to Face”: Rediscovering the Right to Confront Prosecution Witnesses’ 
(2004) 8 E & P 1, 17: ‘even if confrontation served no other value at all, it would be important to honour 
the right that accused persons have had for many centuries governing how witnesses against them may 
testify’; R.D. Friedman, ‘Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles’ (1998) 86 Georgetown LJ 1011 
(hereinafter ‘Basic Principles’), esp 1028: ‘Giving the accused the right to confront the witnesses against 
him is a fundamental part of the way we do judicial business […] We should adhere to it even if in the 
particular case it does not help accurate fact-finding – just as we adhere to the rights of counsel and trial 
by jury without having to ask whether to do so in the particular case will do more good than harm.’ The 
influence on the Supreme Court can be seen by comparing the ‘Basic Principles’ essay, especially the jury 
trial analogy, with the judgment in Crawford. 
69 On this justification for the adversary system, see D. Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1988) 87-92. Luban is sceptical of the argument.  
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has been said to give some idea of how the confrontation right currently found in 
the United States might be justified. 
 
POLICE TACTICS 
 
When we move beyond the pronouncements of the courts, we find a slightly 
richer set of theories of confrontation, with more explicit argument about its 
value. William O’Brian’s close analysis of confrontation provides a good starting 
point. O’Brian argues that the English courts, and the ECtHR, should adopt the 
rigid approach to confrontation found in Crawford.70 For O’Brian, a strong 
confrontation right ‘reflects the fact that “there is something deep in human 
nature that regards face to face confrontation between accused and accuser as 
‘essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.’”’71  
 
Although confrontation is clearly of great value in the search for truth [...] it 
reflects other values as well. Requiring accusers to do so in public and subject 
to questioning forces them to face the fact that their accusations impose real 
human costs on their target. It is part of the ‘bargain’ that we make with the 
liberal state that, before it can deprive us of our liberty, it must give us a fair 
hearing at which [...] those who accuse us must have the courage to make 
their accusations where we can challenge them directly. It also reinforces the 
right to a jury trial by insisting that the jury, not the judge, make the critical 
decision on the reliability of evidence.72 
 
There is a lot in these remarks. We will explore the idea of something ‘deep in 
human nature’ and the demand that accusers be courageous below. As for the rest 
of the passage, one reason for quoting these comments is that they demonstrate 
something one commonly finds in discussions of confrontation: that appeals to 
non-epistemic values of confrontation are often rather nebulous. For one obvious 
explanation of why it is valuable to have accusers see the human costs of their 
testimony is that this may make them think twice about lying; our ability to 
challenge them may also help to expose lies or mistakes. These are obviously 
epistemic concerns. The right to a jury trial, however, may be a non-epistemic 
value, but it is not a convincing one in this respect. After all, many trials, even in 
England, take place without a jury, and even if we confine our focus to jury trials it 
is not true that juries do not get to decide on the reliability of hearsay.   
O’Brian goes on to make a more explicitly epistemic case for confrontation, 
and here his arguments are more convincing. ‘[S]tatements that are created once 
                                                     
70 O’Brian, n 22 above, 481. 
71 ibid, 499. O’Brian is here quoting from Coy v Iowa 487 US 1012 (1988), 1017, which in turn quotes 
Pointer v Texas 380 US 400 (1965), 404. 
72 ibid, 500. 
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litigation is anticipated or underway’, he notes, ‘are inherently suspect.’73 Even 
where a witness has no axe to grind – recall the Court of Appeal’s number plate 
example – police questioning can be suggestive and manipulative. Margaret Berger 
has made a similar argument.74 While O’Brian’s contention seems to be that 
testimonial hearsay is simply unreliable, Berger puts a slightly different spin on 
police manipulation. Labelling her account a ‘prosecutorial restraint’ model, she 
suggests that because confrontation allows the defence to pose questions about 
how statements were elicited, it will deter the police from using problematic 
tactics. She casts this account as non-epistemic, but because the ultimate concern 
is the quality of evidence that comes before the jury it is better seen, in my 
terminology, as an epistemic theory of confrontation.75 
There is certainly good reason to be concerned about police interviews with 
witnesses. Research in England and Wales found that ‘interviews were […] highly 
interviewer driven, with a confirmatory bias’.76 One assessment concludes that 
‘Officers are apt to interview witnesses in ways that are wholly improper and 
ineffective’.77 However, a strong confrontation right may not be the best way to 
deal with the problem. To the extent that the problem is suggestion, where the 
police version of events is to some degree internalised, cross-examination may be 
ineffective, especially as trials tend to take place some time after the alleged crime, 
with witnesses ‘refreshing’ memory from the witness statement. Berger’s hope is 
that confrontation will encourage better police performance, but, even if cross-
examination is good at rooting out police malpractice, there must be some doubt 
as to whether its prospect will have much impact on the police, especially given 
the high rate of guilty pleas.78 Tape-recording of interviews with witnesses may be 
a rather more effective way of controlling police tactics, and would allow some 
assessment of what went on irrespective of whether the witness is available for 
cross-examination.79 By focussing on concerns about presenting the fact-finder 
                                                     
73 ibid, 500-501. 
74 M.A. Berger, ‘The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial 
Restraint Model’ (1992) 76 Minnesota L Rev 557. 
75 However, Berger does go somewhat beyond this, noting that because confrontation can bring 
problematic police tactics to light, it may sometimes prompt the jury to exercise jury equity. ibid, 600. 
76 C. Clarke and R. Milne National Evaluation of the PEACE Investigative Interviewing Course (London: Home 
Office, 2001) 58-59. 
77 E. Shepherd and R. Milne, ‘”Have you Told Management about this?” Bringing Witness Interviewing 
Into the Twenty-First Century’ in A. Heaton-Armstrong, et al (eds), Witness Testimony: Psychological, 
Investigative and Evidential Perspectives (Oxford: OUP, 2006) 58-59. 
78 There are parallels here with the debates about deterrence of police misconduct as a rationale for the 
exclusion of improperly obtained evidence. The literature is massive, but a good sceptical account is C. 
Slobogin, ‘Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule’ (1999) Illinois L Rev 363. My own view is 
that the sceptical arguments are a bit overdone in the context of the exclusionary rule, but I suspect we 
have less reason to believe in deterrence where confrontation is concerned: for one thing, we are relying 
on the ability of cross-examination to bring out manipulation of the declarant, and it must be doubtful 
whether it often will do. 
79 The ECtHR has used tape-recording of witness interviews as one factor in its assessment of whether 
the confrontation right has been breached: Melnikov, n 36 above at [76]. Of course, tape-recording is not a 
perfect solution, as conversations may be rehearsed before the tape is switched on. But it is through 
listening to recordings that the researchers quoted above concluded that police were pursuing a one-sided 
agenda. 
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with unreliable evidence, O’Brian escapes these particular criticisms. It is, 
however, not obvious that the product of police questioning is so unreliable that 
we are better off not admitting it at all unless there is confrontation – especially if 
a tape-recording of the interview is available. I return to this point below. 
By drawing attention to the possibility of police abuse of the questioning 
process, O’Brian and Berger gesture at a slightly different value inherent in 
confrontation. The trial of Sir Walter Raleigh is often taken to be paradigmatic of 
the possibility of abuse in a system without confrontation. Raleigh was convicted 
of treason, largely on the basis of the testimony of Sir Thomas Cobham, who had 
apparently told his questioners that Raleigh had been part of a plot to overthrow 
James I.80 Cobham did not testify at the trial, and, despite Raleigh’s pleas and 
Cobham’s availability, the court refused to order that he be brought before it to 
repeat his accusation. While Raleigh is the best known example, those involved in 
drafting the US Constitution would have been aware of a long history of similar 
abuses, including the use of ‘ex parte’ procedures by the British to try colonists.81 
In the passage quoted above, O’Brian refers to a bargain with the liberal state. This 
is unhelpful rhetoric, but we should note that one strand of liberalism is a 
‘liberalism of fear’82 where we construct institutions in order to protect ourselves 
from a state that cannot always be trusted.83 With authoritarian government being 
part of recent European history, we can appreciate that a liberalism of fear may be 
one reason why the ECtHR has taken to upholding a strong confrontation right – 
and also why English judges, coming from a country with a more stable political 
history, might react with bemusement. It is well worth highlighting this aspect of 
confrontation, but the argument is basically an epistemic one, raising issues about 
the reliability of unconfronted evidence.84 
 
IGNOBILITY 
 
As we have seen, O’Brian refers to the value of having witnesses face those whom 
they accuse. Above, it was suggested that this was most naturally interpreted as an 
epistemic justification for confrontation. But in an interesting take on the 
confrontation right, endorsed by O’Brian, Sherman Clark has developed another 
way in which we might understand this aspect of confrontation.85 Clark labels his 
                                                     
80 Raleigh’s Case 2 How St Tr 1. 
81 See Crawford, n 5 above, 47-48. 
82 See J. Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance’ (2003) 11 J Political Philosophy 191, 205. 
Waldron attributes the idea to Judith Shklar: ‘The Liberalism of Fear’ in N.L. Rosenblum (ed), Liberalism 
and the Moral Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1989). 
83 This perspective may also help to illuminate the reference to jury trial in Crawford, quoted above at n 61, 
because the jury is often thought of as an institution that protects defendants from abuse of state power.  
84 It is also possible to argue that the political context makes modern trials very different from the ones 
that concerned the framers, and thus that we should give less weight to confrontation than they did. See 
R.J. Allen, ‘From the Enlightenment to Crawford to Holmes’ (2009) 39 Seton Hall L Rev 1. 
85 S.J. Clark, ‘An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation Clause’ (2003) 81 Nebraska L Rev 
1258. 
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theory an ‘accuser obligation’ account, whereby confrontation is not so much a 
duty placed on the state for the defendant’s benefit, as a duty placed on citizens to 
testify in an appropriate manner:  
 
We demand that those who would perform this potentially dangerous, 
morally weighty, and symbolically loaded act--the act of accusation--be willing 
to do so face to face. We impose this requirement not only because out-of-
court accusations are unreliable, though they may often be, but also in 
response to a deep, if inchoate, feeling that it is somehow beneath us--
inconsistent with our sense of who we want to be as a community--to allow 
witnesses against criminal defendants to “hide behind the shadow” when 
making an accusation. On this interpretation, requiring confrontation is a way 
of reminding ourselves that we are, or at least want to see ourselves as, the 
kind of people who decline to countenance or abet what we see as the 
cowardly and ignoble practice of hidden accusation.86  
 
The central idea is that in some circumstances a witness may behave ‘ignobly’ by 
making an accusation and then avoiding confrontation. One significant point 
about Clark’s account, however, is that it probably would not justify excluding the 
statement to the police in Al-Khawaja. Clark allows that a declarant’s inability to 
testify does not necessarily display the sort of ignobility that the clause guards 
against, thus in Al-Khawaja the complainant’s death makes a good case for 
admissibility. This underlines the point that confrontation theory matters. Contrast 
O’Brian’s approach, where a statement to the police is the paradigmatic example 
of evidence that should be excluded. For him, an inability to testify cannot justify 
admissibility. Another case where the approaches might come apart would be 
where a declarant is questioned by an undercover police officer posing as a fellow 
criminal. Here, the declarant would presumably not be aware of the testimonial 
nature of the statement – she would not expect it to be used in court – and so for 
Clark the confrontation right would not attach.87 But for O’Brian, police 
manipulation is presumably in issue, so under his primary grounding of the right 
confrontation would be necessary.  
Clark argues that his account can justify a focus on testimonial statements. 
The more accusatorial a statement, the more problematic we might think it if the 
declarant avoids confrontation. Clark gives an example of a courier who keeps 
records of the parcels she delivers.88 He argues that, should the question of 
whether the courier delivered a particular package to D become an important part 
of the prosecution’s case, there is no right to confront the witness. I do not want 
                                                     
86 ibid, 1258.   
87 This would also be the result under Friedman’s approach, which emphasises whether the declarant 
could have been expected to realise that she was making a statement for forensic purposes. See R.D. 
Friedman, ‘Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial”’ (2005) 71 Brooklyn L Rev 241. For the US 
Supreme Court, the emphasis on the questioner’s perspective found in Davis, n 15 above, might lead to a 
different result. 
88 ibid, 1273. 
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to press the point, but there may be some question about this: once the courier 
becomes aware that the defendant’s fate hinges on the accuracy of her record, 
might it not be ignoble of her to avoid the trial? Perhaps this is not as bad as 
making an accusation never intending to repeat it in the accused’s presence. But 
Clark’s account is not confined to such ‘hidden accusations’, for it includes 
witnesses who make testimonial statements and later decide not to testify at trial,89 
a situation which is roughly on a par with the courier example. 
 
SOMETHING DEEP IN HUMAN NATURE 
 
Clark’s analysis of confrontation suggests one way of developing a non-epistemic 
theory, and removing the focus from reliability. There are other possibilities. Some 
years before Crawford, the US Supreme Court in Coy v Iowa considered the 
importance of face to face confrontation in a case involving testimony given by 
video-link.90 The majority quoted from various non-legal sources in order to 
illustrate the long history of confrontation. It explained that: 
 
This opinion is embellished with references to and quotations from antiquity 
in part to convey that there is something deep in human nature that regards 
face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as ‘essential to a fair 
trial in a criminal prosecution’. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 380 U. S. 404 
(1965). What was true of old is no less true in modern times. President 
Eisenhower once described face-to-face confrontation as part of the code of 
his home town of Abilene, Kansas. In Abilene, he said, it was necessary to 
‘[m]eet anyone face to face with whom you disagree. You could not sneak up 
on him from behind, or do any damage to him, without suffering the penalty 
of an outraged citizenry […] In this country, if someone dislikes you, or 
accuses you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow.’ 
[...] The phrase still persists, ‘Look me in the eye and say that.’91 
 
However, the Coy majority ultimately seems to have favoured an epistemic 
interpretation of the historical importance of confrontation. Thus ‘the perception 
that confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because 
there is much truth to it’92 – the point being the now familiar one that 
confrontation may aid lie detection. Face to face confrontation was also said to 
                                                     
89 Another question is whether Clark can justify a confrontation right in a case where the declarant 
decides not to testify, not because she lacks the courage to confront D, but because she no longer 
supports the prosecution: as in a domestic violence case where the declarant becomes reconciled with her 
partner.  
90 n 71 above. 
91 ibid, 1017-1018. 
92 ibid, 1019. 
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have ‘much the same purpose’ as the right to cross-examine: ensuring the integrity 
of the fact-finding process.93 
Of course, the ‘something deep in human nature’ can also be given a non-
epistemic interpretation, and some commentators have tried to unpack the idea in 
this way. For example, Toni Massaro argues that there is more to confrontation 
than the enhancement of fact-finding.94 Linking her analysis to the ‘dignitarian’ 
strand in due process theorising, the high point of her argument is that:  
 
Commonly-held notions about ‘fair play’ and ‘decent treatment’ of others in 
social and business relationships indicate that most people accord intrinsic 
value to face-to-face encounters. [...] The United States military acknowledges 
this intrinsic value of face-to-face encounters by its practice of delivering the 
news of the death of a serviceman or woman in person. Likewise, in the 
business world it is ‘indecent’ to terminate an employee with a letter, instead 
of in a face-to-face exchange. To use a letter demonstrates a lack of respect 
for the affected person, and implies he or she is of low status. People in our 
culture thus regard the delivery of significant bad news through a letter, a 
telephone call, or other impersonal devices as the choice of a messenger who 
is cowardly, or who lacks respect for the equality, humanity, and dignity of 
the recipient.95 
 
The extent to which this analogy works is questionable. If the state introduces the 
evidence of an absent witness, is it really violating the accused’s dignity by treating 
him in an impersonal manner? The trial itself remains a face to face proceeding, 
and the accused will hear any bad news – a guilty verdict – delivered personally. At 
its strongest, Massaro’s argument seems to collapse into Clark’s: the accuser has an 
obligation to face the accused.  
Eileen Scallen has also tried to tease out reasons why confrontation may be 
valued apart from its contribution to fact-finding.96 She argues that confrontation 
is necessary ‘as part of the social relationship between the individual defendant and 
the accusing witness’,97 and draws on social science research on the reasons why 
people confront each other in everyday life. Many of these reasons do not map 
easily onto the criminal trial; the strongest point seems to be that confrontation 
has cathartic functions.98 In everyday life confrontation may allow us to vent our 
frustrations; in a criminal trial perhaps it is important that the defendant should 
have the satisfaction of seeing his accuser repeat the accusation to his face, even if 
the witness is an impressive one and her presence actually damages his case.  
                                                     
93 ibid. 
94 T.M. Massaro, ‘The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations’ (1988) 40 U Florida L Rev 863. 
95 ibid, 904. 
96 E.A. Scallen, ‘Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional 
Confrontation Clause’ (1992) 76 Minnesota L Rev 623. 
97 ibid, 642. 
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There may be a danger in trying to over-rationalise confrontation. There are 
other aspects of criminal procedure which we generally take to be important but 
which are hard to theorise satisfactorily: the privilege against self-incrimination, 
the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence, and the public nature of the trial 
are examples.99 Perhaps ‘something deep in human nature’, or the idea of 
catharsis, vague though they are, are the best explanations of the non-epistemic 
value of confrontation that we can expect. Even granting that, though, we should 
still question whether the importance of confrontation, whatever it may be, can 
justify a strong confrontation right. Tellingly, neither Massaro nor Scallen argue 
for a right as strong as the one now supported by the US Supreme Court and the 
ECtHR, which excludes a witness statement even when its maker has suddenly 
died. There is, though, the argument favoured by Friedman, which puts a slightly 
different twist on the idea of ‘something deep in human nature’. Confrontation is 
just the way we do things: testimony must be given in court, and we should not 
tolerate a system that allows it to be given otherwise.100 This way of seeing things 
may make more sense in the US, where the right was written into the 
Constitution101 – though it must be said that Friedman advocates strong 
confrontation rights in Europe, too.102 It is certainly worth contrasting Friedman’s 
position with that of the Canadian Supreme Court, which takes the history to 
indicate that ‘the optimal way of testing evidence adopted by our adversarial 
system is to have the declarant state the evidence in court, under oath, and under 
the scrutiny of contemporaneous cross-examination.’103 The emphasis here is on 
‘optimal’: exceptions are permitted. Even if we read the history as establishing an 
unbending rule, that does not mean that the right is so valuable that we should not 
now contemplate exceptions. To return to the jury trial analogy: jury trial has 
ancient roots, but in England we have recently introduced an exception in cases 
where there are concerns about the intimidation of jurors.104 It is hard to see why 
history should rule out such a reappraisal of the right.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
99 For discussion of these various examples, see A. Duff, et al, The Trial on Trial: Volume 3. Towards a 
Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
100 See n 68 above. Note that this way of putting the argument depends on classifying what the declarant 
does during police questioning as ‘testifying’; this might be disputed.  
101 Though this begs various questions about what the founders intended. See, eg, D. Sklansky, ‘Hearsay’s 
Last Hurrah’ 2010 Sup Ct L Rev (forthcoming). 
102 Friedman, n 32 above; R.D. Friedman, ‘The Confrontation Right Across the Systemic Divide’ in J. 
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THE PROBLEM WITH A STRONG CONFRONTATION RIGHT 
 
This survey of confrontation theory suggests that confrontation is valuable. That is 
not surprising. But, as should now be obvious, the important question is whether 
the values underlying the confrontation right justify a right which has roughly the 
shape and rigidity of the one we find under the ECHR and the US Constitution. 
In each jurisdiction the right is a strong one, with no exception made for cases 
such as Al-Khawaja where the declarant is simply unable to testify. But, tellingly, 
the right is not too strong: it is, after all, subject to forfeiture. Forfeiture seems to 
me to be a very significant exception to the right, because it is a useful way of 
testing the coherence of confrontation theory. Any advocate of a really strong 
confrontation right, which could not be forfeited, would have to accept that a 
defendant who deliberately killed the key prosecution witness in order to prevent 
her from testifying might be acquitted as a result, even though the prosecution 
possessed a detailed and convincing statement from the witness incriminating the 
defendant. Unsurprisingly, no supporters of confrontation have argued for that 
result. Yet it may be that the structure of their theories commits them to it. For if 
the right is otherwise a strong one – no exception for Al-Khawaja – and is an 
epistemic right, ie it is reliability based, it looks to be very hard to justify a 
forfeiture exception. Does the defendant who kills the witness forfeit his right to 
be convicted only on reliable evidence? Consider an analogous situation, where a 
defendant burns down the forensic science laboratory where important evidence 
in his case is waiting to be tested. That might stymie the prosecution in its efforts 
to prove the case against him, but we would surely be reluctant to say that the 
defendant had forfeited his right to proof beyond reasonable doubt and that we 
should be satisfied with a lower standard of proof.  
Might non-epistemic accounts of confrontation be better able to account for 
the shape of the right? One difficulty here is that truly non-epistemic theories are 
elusive. Apparently non-epistemic accounts often seem to resolve themselves into 
epistemic ones. But if we do allow that there is non-epistemic value in 
confrontation, it is doubtful that this can justify a strong confrontation right. The 
most promising non-epistemic account may be Clark’s accuser obligation theory. 
Even if we accept, for the sake of argument, that the ignobility of failing to testify 
in court can ground a strong confrontation right, the right will be shaped by the 
presence of ignobility, and will not justify excluding the evidence in Al-Khawaja. 
Other non-epistemic theories might give some basis for a confrontation right in 
Al-Khawaja, but they simply look to be too weak to do the work required of them: 
is Al-Khawaja’s inability to attain catharsis really a reason to acquit him? As for the 
argument from historical embedding – that confrontation, like jury trial, is just the 
way we do things – it too is destabilised by forfeiture.105 And if proponents of 
                                                     
105 This is most obvious in the US context, where the analogy with jury trial drawn in Crawford simply fails 
to acknowledge that the right to trial by jury cannot be forfeited. In Giles, n 12 above, 21, the majority 
acknowledges this point, but uses it against the minority’s argument for a wide forfeiture exception, 
rather than to interrogate the coherence of its own position. Things are different in England, because 
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confrontation concede that forfeiture is simply a sensible exception to the right, 
then why should there not be other exceptions? 
By distinguishing between different confrontation theories, and dealing with 
each in isolation, it might be claimed that I am failing to do justice to what is 
surely the most plausible account of confrontation: that it incorporates all of the 
different values which have been identified.106 But amalgamation makes little 
difference to the key issues. Exclusion in a case like Al-Khawaja cannot be justified 
by the accuser obligation elements of the account, so here the focus must be on 
reliability. But if reliability plays a role in all cases, then forfeiture cannot be 
justified. Of course, if a witness has been threatened, or killed, there may be no 
ignobility in her failing to testify; but if the absence of accuser obligation cannot 
justify admissibility in Al-Khawaja, it cannot justify it in a forfeiture case either.   
The arguments so far have been brief, and have not addressed all possible 
justifications for the sort of confrontation right we find in the United States and 
Europe. For now, though, I hope to have at least raised serious questions about 
the case for such a right. Accepting that the doctrinal right has been destabilised, 
however, does not tell us what the solution should be. If epistemic theories cannot 
justify forfeiture, does this mean that we should abandon the forfeiture exception? 
Or should we adopt an accuser obligation approach, and recognise an exception in 
any case where the declarant is unable to testify? The latter approach seems to me 
to be on the right track, so far as the shape of the confrontation right is 
concerned. However, Clark’s analysis provides an insufficiently convincing 
justification for a confrontation right. The better way to think about the value of 
confrontation is closer to a reliability-based analysis – but reliability is not really 
the right concept to use. 
 
 
 
RELIABILITY AND THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
 
Astute commentators on confrontation have recognised that reliability is a 
problematic concept in evidence law.107 If we took an admonition to exclude 
unreliable evidence seriously, we might end up excluding all evidence. Eyewitness 
evidence is an obvious example, but so is confession evidence. Even DNA 
evidence might be based on a contaminated sample, or be given too much weight 
by the fact-finder. Moreover, in the context of confrontation, an emphasis on 
                                                                                                                                       
there is no right to jury trial where there are concerns about jury tampering (see n 104 above). However, 
there is no need to prove that D is responsible for attempts to interfere with jurors before the right is 
lost, so rather than an example of forfeiture, this might be better seen as an example of jury trial simply 
being impractical. 
106 This approach is taken by O’Brian, n 22 above, and Friedman, eg, ‘Face to Face’ n 68 above. 
107 See Friedman, ‘Basic Principles’, n 68 above; D.A. Nance, ‘Rethinking Confrontation After Crawford’ 
(2004) 2 International Commentary on Evidence; P. Westen, ‘Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A 
Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases’ (1978) 91 Harvard L Rev 567. 
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reliability is potentially very unruly. It cannot easily justify the focus on testimonial 
statements (business records can be unreliable), nor even on prosecution evidence. 
Thus when O’Brian notes that statements made in the shadow of litigation are 
‘inherently suspect’, he risks justifying the exclusion of defence hearsay evidence 
too. But in reality, reliability is not a very realistic concern when it comes to 
hearsay evidence. Even if much hearsay evidence is suspect, that does not give us 
any reason to exclude it unless we think that the fact-finder will give it too much 
weight, and where hearsay is concerned the empirical evidence lends little support 
to this possibility.108 
But if reliability is not a useful concept, does that leave us with no objection 
to make when the prosecution presents the evidence of an absent witness? There 
appears to be something very problematic about relying on the evidence of an 
absent witness when the witness could actually be called to testify. But this is most 
convincingly explained, not in terms of the prosecution introducing unreliable 
evidence, but in terms of there being better evidence available: the declarant’s 
testimony in court. This reflects a principle of evidence law sometimes referred to 
as the ‘best evidence principle’, which has some claim to be a unifying principle of 
evidence law.109 In this specific context, though, the claim is not that testimony in 
court is necessarily preferable to an out of court statement. The witness may lie in 
court, or offer confusing credibility cues. A preferable way to put the point is that 
bringing the witness to court gives us more evidence – the witness’s demeanour as 
well as her answers to questions on examination and cross-examination. This can 
be set alongside any out-of-court statement to present the most complete picture 
possible. 
There is a connection here with reliability, in that more evidence is generally 
better than less if we are trying to find the truth, which is why it is desirable to 
present any available evidence.110 (Additionally, when the prosecution fails to 
produce easily available evidence, our suspicions will be raised, as in the Raleigh 
trial.) The desirability of basing a decision on as much evidence as possible may 
give us a reason to exclude some hearsay evidence. If the declarant is easily 
available, we might want to exclude the witness statement in order to provide the 
prosecution with an incentive to produce the better evidence. However, the fact 
that the amount of evidence we have is connected to the reliability of the decisions 
we make gives us no reason to exclude the statement of an absent prosecution 
witness. Defendants do not have a right to have a particular amount of evidence 
admitted against them: they have no legitimate complaint if certain evidence, that 
might be helpful to their case, is missing (so long as it is not the prosecution’s fault 
that it is missing – a point to be taken up below).111 We would not stop a trial just 
                                                     
108 R. Park, ‘Visions of Applying the Scientific Method to the Hearsay Rule’ (2003) Michigan State L Rev 
1149. 
109 D.A. Nance, ‘The Best Evidence Principle’ (1987) 73 Iowa L Rev 227. 
110 Alex Stein has denied this: see Foundations of Evidence Law (Oxford: OUP, 2005). For discussion, see M. 
Redmayne, ‘The Structure of Evidence Law’ (2006) 26 OJLS 805, esp 814-815. 
111 As Nance, n 107 above, 10, puts it: ‘It is senseless to disadvantage or penalize the prosecution in the 
confrontation context, by excluding probative evidence – just because the situation makes it more 
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because a key defence witness has dropped dead.112 What defendants do have a 
right to is to proof beyond reasonable doubt. But that is an issue of sufficiency of 
evidence, about when a case is strong enough to be left to the jury, not a doctrine 
about what evidence can be admitted. To be sure, concerns about sufficiency of 
evidence may be germane in prosecutions based on the evidence of an absent 
witness, but that is a reason for withdrawing some cases from the jury, not for a 
rigid rule making all testimonial hearsay inadmissible. 
At this point, an analogy may be helpful. Courts sometimes face difficult 
decisions about whether to allow a case to go to the jury when the alleged crime 
occurred a long time ago.113 The passage of time may well mean that there is less 
evidence available than there would otherwise be. It may, in particular, mean that 
evidence of potential use to the defence will no longer be available. In the way 
English courts approach such cases we do find some support for the sort of 
approach the ECtHR takes to confrontation; but not, I suggest, enough to ground 
a strong right to confrontation. 
In some cases where delay has led to the loss of potentially exculpatory 
evidence – such as documents, or evidence to support an alibi – courts have 
stayed proceedings. For example, in B the defendant had been convicted of sexual 
offences allegedly committed some 30 years earlier.114 While not criticising the 
conduct of the trial, the Court of Appeal held that D’s conviction was unsafe: ‘All 
that the defendant could do was to say that he had not committed the acts alleged 
against him. [...] [W]hen faced with allegations of the sort that were made here, “I 
have not done it” is virtually no defence at all.’115 Shortly afterwards, the Court 
expressed some doubt about this decision, but also noted that one distinguishing 
feature of the appeal currently before it was that there was some material that 
could be used in cross-examination of the complainant.116 In Ali, the Court of 
Appeal reflected on the issues: ‘The mere fact that missing material might have 
assisted the defence will not necessarily lead to a stay’; there should, however, be 
‘sufficiently credible evidence, apart from the missing evidence, leaving the defence [sic] 
to exploit the gaps left by the missing evidence. The rationale for refusing a stay is 
the existence of credible evidence, itself untainted by what has gone missing.’117 
While the Court of Appeal has not always taken a consistent line in cases 
where a defendant has been disadvantaged by delay,118 it does seem that there is 
                                                                                                                                       
difficult for the accused to defend himself than it might have been under an hypothesized alternative 
reality.’ 
112 See Westen, n 107 above. 
113 For detailed discussion, see D. Hamer, ‘Trying Delays: A Balanced Response to Forensic 
Disadvantage’, unpublished ms, on file with the author. See also A. Choo, Abuse of Process and Judicial Stays 
of Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 2008) ch 3.  
114 [2003] EWCA Crim 319. 
115 ibid at [28]. 
116 R v E [2004] 2 Cr App R 36. 
117 [2007] EWCA Crim 691 at [29]-[30] (original emphasis). 
118 See R v S [2006] EWCA Crim 756, which lays down a series of principles to govern delay cases and 
suggests that, where there is no fault on the part of the prosecution, stays should be exceptional. It is also 
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considerable unease about the fairness of a trial in which a defendant is not able to 
challenge the evidence against him. This chimes quite well with the approach the 
ECtHR takes to confrontation. As we have seen, the Court does not hold that 
defendants have a right of face to face confrontation with even accusatorial 
witnesses; instead, defendants seem to have a right to challenge such witnesses. 
While the case law usually takes challenge to involve an ability to put questions to 
a witness, in Al-Khawaja the Court did not quite rule out the possibility that some 
less direct means of challenge might be acceptable.119 The Court engaged with the 
UK Government’s argument that the presence of two ‘recent complaint’ witnesses 
at the trial, to whom the complainant had made allegations about D, counter-
balanced D’s lack of direct confrontation by allowing him to explore 
inconsistencies between the accounts. The Court, however, was unimpressed by 
this argument, because the inconsistencies between the accounts were minor.120 
This is a painfully bad response to the Government’s point – it is rather like saying 
that a defendant had an unfair trial because the evidence pointed overwhelmingly 
towards guilt. What surely matters, and helps to make the trial fair, is that Al-
Khawaja had access to evidence that could potentially have undermined the case 
against him.  
What should we make of the analogy with the delay cases? It is possible to 
take a fairly hard-headed view, and to argue that so long as the prosecution case is 
strong enough to go to the jury, then the fact that the accused no longer has 
access to evidence that might have helped his case is neither here nor there. The 
best way to see the problem in B – and perhaps some of the other cases – then, 
may be that the case was not strong enough to go to the jury. English courts might 
be reluctant to put the point this way, because the principle in Galbraith121 is that 
issues of credibility are for the jury, and thus that so long as the complainant 
makes a coherent allegation, the accused has a case to answer. But that the crime 
simply cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt is surely an apt diagnosis when 
the prosecution case rests on a thirty-year-old allegation with no corroboration. 
We might say that the problem is that we simply have no way to test the evidence, 
and that untested evidence is weaker – so long as testing is understood to 
incorporate not only challenges by the defence, but also whether the evidence fits 
with any prosecution evidence. In this way, cross-examination is not significant in 
itself, but only as one of a range of ways of resolving (or not) doubts about the 
prosecution case. In Al-Khawaja the supporting evidence spoke to some doubts 
about the complainant, making the case a reasonably strong one to leave to the 
jury. But Al-Khawaja’s sibling case, Tahery, is a different matter. Here the victim was 
unable to say for certain who his attacker was, and the key prosecution witness, 
                                                                                                                                       
worth noting that courts are reluctant to take strong action where a defendant has lost an opportunity to 
challenge eyewitness evidence through an identification procedure: see A. Roberts, ‘Pre-Trial Defence 
Rights and the Fair Use of Eyewitness Identification Procedures’ (2008) 71 MLR 331. 
119 See n 42 above. 
120 n 1, above at [42]. 
121 R v Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060. 
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who was absent, had made a statement that was in certain respects inconsistent 
with the victim’s evidence.122 This was a weak case, and there is a good argument 
that it should never have been left to the jury.123  
If, however, it is thought that there is independent significance in the 
defendant’s ability to challenge the prosecution case, one should note that while 
the defendant may be more or less defenceless in some of the delay cases, the 
inability to question a prosecution witness does not always leave a defendant in 
such a situation. Thus, as we have seen, Al-Khawaja did have potential resources 
with which to challenge the prosecution case (even Tahery did, in that he could 
point to inconsistencies between the accounts). It is in fact an important part of 
the Criminal Justice Act scheme for regulating hearsay evidence that the accused is 
allowed to introduce evidence relating to the absent witness’s credibility – 
including evidence which he might not be able to call were the witness present in 
court.124 Indeed, we should be wary of depicting cross-examination as always 
being the most effective way of challenging witnesses. Where, for example, expert 
evidence is concerned, alternative means of challenge, such as disclosure and 
funding for defence experts, may be more helpful.125  
 
 
 
RETHINKING CONFRONTATION 
 
Much of the argument to this point has taken issue with advocates of a strong 
confrontation right. The argument has also tended to focus on the situation in Al-
Khawaja – where a witness has unexpectedly died – to tease out some of the 
problems with a strong right. More now needs to be said about how the 
theoretical commitments underlying the argument – largely, the best evidence 
principle – shape a confrontation right, and what the implications are for less 
absolute causes of absence.  
In the preceding section, it was argued that it may be problematic if the 
prosecution does not present the best available evidence at trial. This suggests that 
we can think of the confrontation right as being a right to cross-examine available 
witnesses. As we have seen, advocates of a strong confrontation right have tended 
to restrict the scope of the right to a certain class of witnesses: roughly, ones who 
make accusations. However, having rejected the arguments for a strong right, we 
                                                     
122 The case was heard together with Al-Khawaja in the ECtHR: see n 1 above. The facts are clearer in the 
Court of Appeal’s decision: [2006] EWCA Crim 529.  
123 In theory, s 125 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides some protection here. This gives a court the 
power to direct an acquittal where the prosecution case depends on hearsay evidence which is so 
unconvincing that a conviction would be unsafe. It is not clear how much of a safeguard this provides in 
practice. In Joyce [2005] EWCA Crim 1785 at [19], the section is said not to set a higher standard than 
Galbraith, which is slightly troubling. 
124 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 124. 
125 See Sklansky, n 101 above. 
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are left with little reason to restrict the right in this way. The accusatorial 
designation may provide a rough pointer to the witnesses whom it is most 
important to cross-examine, but no more than that. To return to Clark’s example 
of a courier who keeps a record of the packages she delivers: should that person’s 
evidence turn out to be crucial to the prosecution’s case, we might well want to say 
that the accused has a right to cross-examine her about the accuracy of the record. 
But what if the courier has moved abroad, or can no longer remember much 
about the package in question? The framework for answering these questions is 
provided by the best evidence principle. ‘Best’ is obviously a potentially unruly 
criterion. We could always demand that the prosecution put more resources into a 
particular investigation and so produce better evidence. To prevent unreasonable 
demands, best must be understood in terms of what is reasonably practicable, as 
should availability for the purposes of confrontation. A witness should not be 
considered to be available if, like the factory workers in Myers,126 it is unlikely that 
she can remember much about the relevant facts. Nor if the witness has moved to 
Australia and her testimony is not expected to add much of significance. 
The confrontation right, then, should be understood as a right to confront 
witnesses who are practically available. But while the concept of practical 
availability is intended to block unreasonable demands, it should also sanction 
unreasonable laziness. Even if, by the time of the trial, better evidence than the 
witness statement is not available, it might still be appropriate to exclude the 
statement if we could have expected the prosecution to do better. (Here, the 
parallel with cases involving delay re-emerges, because questions of prosecution 
fault are one factor the courts consider in these cases when deciding whether to 
allow a prosecution to proceed.127) For example, in Cole a witness was unavailable 
at trial because of complications surrounding the birth of her child: one might 
have expected the prosecution to have scheduled the case so as not to fall near the 
expected birth date.128 In Keet two elderly witnesses were too frail to give evidence 
by the time of trial – one even had dementia.129 In this situation a solution might 
have been to arrange confrontation prior to trial, something accepted under the 
ECHR and under the Sixth Amendment. Yet, as John Spencer notes, English law 
simply has no provision that would allow this to occur.130 In a broad sense this is 
the fault of the state. Here, there might be an argument for excluding the evidence 
in order to provide an incentive to develop better procedures for prosecuting 
crime.131 Similarly, arguments based on a best evidence view of confrontation 
                                                     
126 n 11 above. 
127 See, generally, A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, The Criminal Process (Oxford: OUP, 4th ed, 2010) ch 
9.4. 
128 R v Cole and Keet [2007] 1 WLR 2716. 
129 ibid. 
130 Spencer, n 17 above, 57-60; J.R. Spencer, ‘Squaring up to Strasbourg: Horncastle in the Supreme Court’ 
(2010) 1 Archbold Review 6. 
131 Similar arguments can be used to justify the exclusion of expert evidence where, although better 
evidence is not immediately available, it is felt that better evidence should be available because insufficient 
research has been conducted (fingerprint evidence is a possible example). See, generally, M. Redmayne, 
Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2001) ch 5. 
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rights might be used to press the state to tape-record witness statements, 
something which would enhance the ability of defendants to challenge witnesses, 
whether or not the witness was absent at trial.132 
Once we open up questions of what is practical, however, and allow that this 
may include obligations on the state to reform its procedures so as to give better 
opportunities for confrontation, even the proper response to the Al-Khawaja 
situation may be debatable. While in this scenario the witness’s unavailability at 
trial is unpredictable, proponents of a strong confrontation right still argue that the 
statement should be excluded because, among other reasons, ‘the prosecution can 
greatly reduce, if not eliminate, this risk [of unavailability] by affording the 
defendant an early opportunity to confront the witnesses.’133 The idea seems to be 
that in any case the prosecution should insure against the risk of a significant 
witness becoming absent by arranging pre-trial confrontation. But if confrontation 
is as valuable as proponents of a strong right make out, this is probably not an 
effective solution. Just as defendants preferred to keep their powder dry rather 
than cross-examine witnesses when ‘live’ committal proceedings were available,134 
it seems unlikely that many defendants would avail themselves of the opportunity 
to question a witness long before trial when there was no hint that the witness 
would not be available at trial. Confrontation would then be a rather hollow right 
in cases of unpredictable absence. If this is wrong, and significant numbers of 
defendants were in fact to take up pre-trial confrontation, there would be very 
considerable resource implications, all as a way of dealing with a problem in a 
handful of cases. Perhaps there is room here for opinions to differ, but without 
convincing theoretical arguments for a strong confrontation right it is very 
difficult to see why the lack of automatic pre-trial confrontation rights should be 
held against the state. 
It will be obvious that the sort of weak confrontation right advocated here 
gives reasonable scope to judicial discretion in deciding questions of practical 
availability. And here, as we have seen, proponents of a strong right have one 
further argument to draw upon. They might concede many of the arguments made 
here, but still argue for a strong right on rule-utilitarian grounds, because such a 
right would prevent judges from admitting unconfronted evidence too readily. The 
rule-utilitarian argument, however, is an argument for clear rules, and not 
necessarily for the shape of the rules favoured by advocates of a strong 
confrontation right. To focus once again on the Al-Khawaja situation, where there 
is obvious inability to testify through no fault of the prosecution: this can still be 
carved out as a clear exception to a rigidly defined confrontation right. Of course, 
                                                     
132 The ECtHR case law offers some purchase to an argument along these lines. In Gossa, n 8 above at 
[55], it was observed that Art 6 ‘requires the contracting states to take positive steps so as to enable the 
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once an exception like this is recognised we will need to trust judges to make 
careful sufficiency decisions in individual cases, and the criticism of Tahery, above, 
suggests that sometimes this trust may be misplaced. However, if advocates of a 
strong right are not prepared to allow this much judicial discretion, then they 
should rule out a forfeiture exception too (because some cases where the accused 
is deemed to have forfeited his right will nevertheless be too weak to go to the 
jury),135 something that none of them seem prepared to do. Further, if there is a 
problem with judicial sufficiency determinations, this affects more cases than ones 
involving absent witnesses. There may well be arguments for reform of the 
Galbraith rule, but that is a wider issue than can be considered here.136 
The weak confrontation right advocated here obviously extends judicial 
discretion beyond Al-Khawaja, to include wider questions of practical availability: 
should the prosecution, for example, be permitted to rely on the statement of a 
witness who has moved to Australia? Or what if the witness, as in Tahery, claims to 
be scared of testifying but there is no suggestion that it is the defendant who has 
caused the fear? Perhaps there would be a case for a strict rule that witness 
statements should be inadmissible in such situations were the rule confined to a 
narrow category of plainly accusatory (as opposed to implicatory) statements. This 
might pick out a group of witnesses where we would always have reason to think 
that the best evidence – testimony from a witness subject to cross-examination – 
would have sufficient added value that questions of practical availability should 
not be considered.137 But once a strong confrontation right extends beyond this, 
to include testimonial witnesses, or all who make statements to the police, then the 
cost of the right in terms of failed prosecutions means that we need a better 
argument than simple generalised distrust of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion, 
after all, can be structured and restrained, as it is under the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 and its case law. Without evidence that this scheme is not working, the case 
for a strong confrontation right remains to be made. 
One final point is worth making. As we have seen, part of the historical 
memory attached to confrontation is fear of state abuse – a ‘liberalism of fear’, as 
it was characterised. A weak confrontation right, as developed here, is reasonably 
well placed to respond to such concerns.138 Only if the declarant is unavailable for 
reasons that the state is not responsible for will there be a strong case for 
                                                     
135 See, eg, R v M [2003] 2 Cr App R 357. 
136 The Criminal Cases Review Commission has suggested that judges are too ready to allow cases to go 
to the jury: Memorandum to Home Affairs Committee, HC 1703 2005-6, para 3.1. The Royal 
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admissibility of the witness statement. Of course, this will not be a guarantee 
against state abuse. One might worry that the state has made a witness disappear, 
faked her suicide, or bought her a ticket to Australia. In particular, cases where the 
witness claims to be scared of testifying will raise difficult questions – but so they 
will even under a strong confrontation right, unless forfeiture is rejected or tightly 
restricted. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I have argued that a strong confrontation right, as found in the 
United States and under the ECHR, cannot be justified. Epistemic justifications 
are problematic in themselves, and struggle to account for a forfeiture exception 
that would keep the right within acceptable limits. Non-epistemic justifications are 
not sufficiently compelling to support a strong right. Drawing on the best 
evidence principle, I have argued that confrontation should be seen as a positive 
right to examine available prosecution witnesses, not as a negative right against 
having the evidence of absent witnesses admitted. 
While the contours of a weak confrontation right have been outlined, I have 
not descended to the level of detail on questions of admissibility. To a large extent 
the arguments here justify the status quo under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and 
its defence by the English courts in Horncastle. However, I have also raised 
questions about whether the English criminal justice system is doing what it 
reasonably can to secure confrontation rights. In this respect, tape-recording of 
witness interviews and measures to allow pre-trial confrontation in cases where 
witness unavailability can be foreseen are relatively simple reforms that would do 
much to enable defendants to challenge the evidence of absent witnesses. 
